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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//University of Liverpool Computer Science Seminar System//v2//EN
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DTSTAMP:20260921T210809Z
UID:Seminar-EcCo-984@lxserverM.csc.liv.ac.uk
ORGANIZER:CN=Nicos 	Protopapas:MAILTO:N.Protopapas@liverpool.ac.uk
DTSTART:20210224T130000
DTEND:20210224T140000
SUMMARY:Economics and Computation Series
DESCRIPTION:Aris Filos-Ratsikas: On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions\n\nWe consider the problem of computing a (pure) Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the first-price auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. We prove that when agents have independent subjective prior beliefs about the value distributions of the other agents, computing an epsilon-equilibrium of the auction is PPAD-complete, and computing an exact equilibrium is FIXP-complete. \n\n\n\nJoint work with Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Alexandros Hollender, Philip Lazos, and Diogo Pocas.\n\nhttps://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/research/seminars/abstract.php?id=984
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