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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//University of Liverpool Computer Science Seminar System//v2//EN
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DTSTAMP:20260922T132654Z
UID:Seminar-EcCo-630@lxserverM.csc.liv.ac.uk
ORGANIZER:CN=Nicos 	Protopapas:MAILTO:N.Protopapas@liverpool.ac.uk
DTSTART:20200701T130000
DTEND:20200701T140000
SUMMARY:Economics and Computation Series
DESCRIPTION:Estelle Varloot: Characterizations of strategy-proof voting rules\n\nWe provide novel characterizations of strategy-proof voting rules when voters have uni-dimensional single-peaked preferences. The analysis links and unifies existing results in the literature such as Moulin's classic characterization in terms of phantom voters and Barbera, Gul and Stacchetti's in terms of winning coalitions (generalized median voter schemes). Moreover, we provide new characterizations of various special cases, combining strategy-proofness with other properties such as responsiveness, consistency, or proportionality.\n\n\nhttps://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/research/seminars/abstract.php?id=630
LOCATION:Microsoft Teams
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