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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//University of Liverpool Computer Science Seminar System//v2//EN
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DTSTAMP:20260922T052509Z
UID:Seminar-EcCo-597@lxserverM.csc.liv.ac.uk
ORGANIZER:CN=Nicos 	Protopapas:MAILTO:N.Protopapas@liverpool.ac.uk
DTSTART:20190320T130000
DTEND:20190320T140000
SUMMARY:Economics and Computation Series
DESCRIPTION:Rida Laraki: Existence of Equilibria in Discontinuous Games\n\nIn economic models, discontinuities arise when players choose the same price, location, bid or stopping time. In this chapter, we are interested by strategic games where utility functions are discontinuous. Our main objective is to present a unified theory of existence of equilibrium-like solutions. Two natural questions are explored: Under which conditions does a Nash equilibrium exist? And when it does not exist, which solution concept to use?\n\nThis is a chapter in the book: "Equilibria in Games: Existence, Selection, and Dynamics » \nEdited by: Alejandro Jofré, Sylvain Sorin, Bernhard von Stengel, 2019 (to appear).\n\nhttps://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/research/seminars/abstract.php?id=597
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