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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//University of Liverpool Computer Science Seminar System//v2//EN
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DTSTAMP:20260921T003300Z
UID:Seminar-EcCo-561@lxserverM.csc.liv.ac.uk
ORGANIZER:CN=Nicos 	Protopapas:MAILTO:N.Protopapas@liverpool.ac.uk
DTSTART:20171101T130000
DTEND:20171101T140000
SUMMARY:Economics and Computation Series
DESCRIPTION:Nicos Protopapas: Impartial Selection\n\nA set of agents must choose a winner among them, through a nomination process. All of them will nominate candidates honestly, but they may be tempt  to play strategically when they are able to win the prize for themselves. An impartial mechanism aims to remove this temptation from the players: Each agent’s nominations must not affect whether that agent is the winner or not. \n\nThe presentation will demonstrate various impartial mechanisms as well as the limitations that impartiality imposes. Most of the presented results are from the papers “Impartial nominations for a prize” by R. Holzman and H. Mouiln and “Optimal impartial selection” from F. Fischer and M. Klimm.\n\nhttps://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/research/seminars/abstract.php?id=561
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