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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//University of Liverpool Computer Science Seminar System//v2//EN
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260919T183112Z
UID:Seminar-dept-313@lxserverM.csc.liv.ac.uk
ORGANIZER:CN=Lutz Oettershagen:MAILTO:Lutz.Oettershagen@liverpool.ac.uk
DTSTART:20130305T160000
DTEND:20130305T170000
SUMMARY:School Seminar Series
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Max Klimm: Competition for Resources: The Existence of Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games\n\nWeighted congestion games are an important class of noncooperative games that constitute an elegant model for the resource usage by selfish users. Unfortunately, they need not possess a pure Nash equilibrium, in general. We give a complete characterization of the maximal sets of cost functions that one can allow on the resources in order to guarantee the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium.\n\nhttps://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/research/seminars/abstract.php?id=313
LOCATION:G12
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