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PRODID:-//University of Liverpool Computer Science Seminar System//v2//EN
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260921T092718Z
UID:Seminar-dept-303@lxserverM.csc.liv.ac.uk
ORGANIZER:CN=Lutz Oettershagen:MAILTO:Lutz.Oettershagen@liverpool.ac.uk
DTSTART:20121203T160000
DTEND:20121203T170000
SUMMARY:School Seminar Series
DESCRIPTION:Prof. Paul Spirakis: Computing Equilibria in Games and Populations\n\nWe consider here two paradigms of interactions among individual entities, namely (1) games (selfish entities) and (2) interactions in populations (specified by some given set of rules). \n\nThe solution concepts that most researchers follow are Nash Equilibria (for games) and Stable Computations (for populations). The talk focuses on the efficiency of computing such solutions. \n\nThe criterion for Nash Equilibria is Polynomial Time.\n\nWe argue that a corresponding criterion for distributed Stable Computations is Polynomial Space. \n\nWe discuss exact and approximate efficient methods for computing Nash Equilibria. We also discuss a variety of models for (distributed) stable computations, and present a space hierarchy. \n\nSome open problems are also highlighted. \n\nThe talk is based on recent research of the speaker and his team.\n\nhttps://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/research/seminars/abstract.php?id=303
LOCATION:G12
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