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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//University of Liverpool Computer Science Seminar System//v2//EN
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DTSTAMP:20260922T121722Z
UID:Seminar-dept-1272@lxserverM.csc.liv.ac.uk
ORGANIZER:CN=Lutz Oettershagen:MAILTO:Lutz.Oettershagen@liverpool.ac.uk
DTSTART:20250516T130000
DTEND:20250516T140000
SUMMARY:School Seminar Series
DESCRIPTION:Edward Plumb: Simultaneous Best-Response Dynamics in Random Potential Games\n\nWe examine the convergence behaviour of simultaneous best-response dynamics in random potential games. We provide a theoretical result showing that, for a sufficiently large number of actions, the dynamics converge quickly to a cycle of length two. This cycle lies within the intersection of the neighbourhoods of two distinct Nash equilibria. For three players or more, simulations show that the dynamics converge quickly to a Nash equilibrium with high probability. Furthermore, this fast convergence is robust, in the sense that it occurs in non-potential games, provided the players' payoffs are highly correlated.  \n\nWe also compare these dynamics to gradient-based learning methods in near-potential games with three players or more, and observe that simultaneous best-response dynamics converge to a Nash equilibrium substantially faster.\n\nhttps://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/research/seminars/abstract.php?id=1272
LOCATION:Ashton Lecture Theatre
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