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PRODID:-//University of Liverpool Computer Science Seminar System//v2//EN
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DTSTAMP:20260920T212302Z
UID:Seminar-dept-1237@lxserverM.csc.liv.ac.uk
ORGANIZER:CN=Lutz Oettershagen:MAILTO:Lutz.Oettershagen@liverpool.ac.uk
DTSTART:20240507T130000
DTEND:20240507T140000
SUMMARY:School Seminar Series
DESCRIPTION:Dr. Ron Lavi: From Monopoly to Competition: When Do Optimal Contests Prevail?\n\nWe study competition among simultaneous heterogeneous contest designers in a general model that allows for a large space of contest design. Contestants choose in which contest to participate, and the goal of each contest designer is to maximize the contestants’ sum of efforts exerted in her contest. Our main result shows that, with symmetric contestants, optimal contests in the monopolistic setting (i.e., those that maximize the sum of efforts in a model with a single contest designer) form Pareto-optimal equilibria when contest designers compete. Under a natural assumption, monopolistic optimal contests are in fact dominant in the competitive case, and the equilibria that they form are unique. In many natural cases, they also maximize the social welfare.\n\n\n\nThis is joint work with Xiaotie Deng, Yotam Gafni, Tao Lin, and Hongyi Ling\n\n\n\n\n\nhttps://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/research/seminars/abstract.php?id=1237
LOCATION:Ashton Lecture Theatre
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