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VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//University of Liverpool Computer Science Seminar System//v2//EN
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DTSTAMP:20260922T101445Z
UID:Seminar-ECON-1132@lxserverM.csc.liv.ac.uk
ORGANIZER:CN=Othon Michail:MAILTO:Othon.Michail@liverpool.ac.uk
DTSTART:20230510T150000
DTEND:20230510T160000
SUMMARY:ECON Series
DESCRIPTION:Mariann Oller: A network solution to robust Implementation\n\nIn this paper, we consider agents who commonly believe that others' types are identically distributed, but we do not assume that the actual distribution is common knowledge, nor that it is known to the designer. First, we characterize the incentive compatible transfers under these assumptions. Second, we characterize the conditions under which full implementation is possible via direct mechanisms, that only elicit payoff-relevant information, and the transfer schemes which achieve it whenever possible. The full implementation results obtain from showing that the problem can be transformed into one of designing a network of strategic externalities, subject to constraints dictated by the incentive compatibility requirements.\n\nhttps://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/research/seminars/abstract.php?id=1132
LOCATION:502 Building, Teaching Room 4
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