

Part III: Epistemic Logic

W. van der Hoek

Extensionality

- Classical logic is extensional:

- $\models (\alpha \leftrightarrow \beta) \rightarrow (\psi \leftrightarrow \psi[\alpha / \beta])$

Varieties of modal logics

Alethic logic	$\Box\varphi$	φ must be the case
Dynamic logic	$[\alpha]\varphi$	after α , φ holds
Deontic logic	$O\varphi$	φ should be
Temporal logic	$\Box\varphi$	always, φ
Doxastic logic	$B\varphi$	φ is believed
Epistemic logic	$K\varphi$	φ is known
Arithmetic logic	$\Box\varphi$	φ is provable


Modal logic

- philosophical logic
- a formal treatment of **intensional** notions
- various 'flavours':
 - epistemic / doxastic
 - temporal / dynamic (action logic)
 - deontic

defining knowledge


p	Kp	Kp	Kp	Kp
0	0	1	0	1
1	1	0	0	1

Semantics of modal logic



Semantics of modal logic

p: it is sunny in Liverpool q: it is sunny in London



Exercise 0. Agent 1 is in Liverpool, agent 2 in London.

Modal logic, semantics

- Kripke models: $M = (W, \pi, R)$
 - W : set of possible worlds
 - π : truth assignment function
 - R : accessibility relation
- $R(w) = \{w' \mid R(w,w')\}$ set of accessible worlds from w

Modal logic, semantics

- $M, w \models \Box \varphi$
- iff $M, w' \models \varphi$
 - for every w' such that $R(w, w')$
- $M, w \models \Diamond \varphi$
- iff $M, w' \models \varphi$

Modal logic, ctd.

- modal logic = 'logic of \Box and \Diamond '
- 'neutral reading': necessity / possibility
- basic property (K):
 - $(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (\Box \varphi \rightarrow \Box \psi)$, or equivalently
 - $((\Box \varphi \wedge \varphi) \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow \Box \psi$
- and Necessitation

epistemic logic

System is called **S5**

as 'difficult' as propositional!

R is an equivalence

no nestings needed:

$$K \neg K K \neg p \leftrightarrow \neg K \neg p$$

no iterations needed:

$$K \neg (K(K \neg p \vee \neg K q) \rightarrow K \neg K q)$$

is unnecessary complex

- $K(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow ($
 - *agents reason*
- $K\varphi \rightarrow \varphi$
 - *veridicality*
- $K\varphi \rightarrow KK\varphi$
 - *positive intro.*
- $\neg K\varphi \rightarrow K\neg K\varphi$
 - *negative intro.*
- $\vdash \neg \varphi \Rightarrow \vdash \neg K\varphi$
 - *agents know*

Semantics

- Let $E = \{M = \langle W, R, V \rangle \mid R \text{ is equiv}\}$
- Let $U = \{M = \langle W, R, V \rangle \mid R \text{ is unive}\}$
- Let $\text{Th}(M) = \{\varphi \mid M \models \varphi\}$
- Then: $\text{Th}(E) = \text{Th}(U)$
 - \subseteq straightforward

Semantics

- $E \models \varphi \Leftrightarrow U \models \varphi \Leftrightarrow S5 \vdash \varphi$
- easy to verify:
 - $KK\varphi \equiv K\varphi$
 - $K\neg K\varphi \equiv \neg K\varphi$
 - $\neg KK\varphi \equiv \neg K\varphi$
 - $\neg K\neg K\varphi \equiv K\varphi$

Semantics

- $E \models \varphi \Leftrightarrow U \models \varphi \Leftrightarrow S5 \vdash \varphi$
- easy to verify:
 - φ is satisfiable iff
 - φ is satisfiable in a model of size with a l states
 - $|p| = 1, |p \wedge \psi| = 1 + |p| + |\psi|$
 - $|\neg\varphi| = |K\varphi| = |\varphi| + 1$

Small model property

- Suppose $\langle S, V \rangle, s \models \varphi$
- $f_s : \text{Sub}(\varphi) \rightarrow 2^S$
 - $f_s(p) = \{s\}$, atoms p in $\text{Sub}(\varphi)$
 - $f_s(\varphi \wedge \psi) = f_s(\varphi) \cap f_s(\psi)$
 - $f_s(\neg\varphi) = S \setminus f_s(\varphi)$
 - $f_s(K\varphi) =$
 - $\{t\}$ if some $\langle S, V \rangle, t \models \varphi$

Small model property

- Let $S' = \{s\} \cup \bigcup_{\psi \in \text{Sub}(\varphi)} f_s(\psi)$
- $V' = V|_{S'}$
- Then: $\langle S', V' \rangle, s \models \varphi$
- Proof: for all s' in S' : all $\psi \in \text{Sub}(\varphi)$
 - $\langle S, V \rangle \models \psi \Leftrightarrow \langle S', V' \rangle \models \psi$

Epistemic and Doxastic Logic

- $K\varphi \rightarrow \varphi$
- $K\varphi \rightarrow KK\varphi$ *knowledge*
- $\neg K\varphi \rightarrow K\neg K\varphi$


- $\neg B\perp$
- $B\varphi \rightarrow BB\varphi$ *belief*
- $\neg B\neg B\varphi \rightarrow B\neg B\neg B\varphi$

Logical Omniscience


- (LO1) $B\varphi \wedge B(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow B\psi$
(Closure under impl)
- (LO2) $\models \varphi \Rightarrow \models B\varphi$
(belief of valid fo)
- (LO3) $\models \varphi \rightarrow \psi \Rightarrow \models B\varphi \rightarrow B\psi$
(Closure under valid impl)

Logical omniscience (2)


- (LO4) $\models \varphi \leftrightarrow \psi \Rightarrow \models B\varphi \leftrightarrow B\psi$
(Belief of equivalent fo
- (LO5) $(B\varphi \wedge B\psi) \rightarrow B(\varphi \wedge \psi)$
(Closure under conj
- (LO6) $B\varphi \rightarrow B(\varphi \vee \psi)$
(Weakening of
- (LO7) $B\varphi \rightarrow \neg B\neg\varphi$




3 x b, 2 x w




3 x b, 2 x w




3 x b, 2 x w




C: "I don't know my colour"




in $w b b$ and $w b w$, agent B knows his color



B: "I don't know my color either"



A: "I know mine!"



Protocol


- Sender and Receiver
- input for S: $X = \langle x_0, x_1, x_2, \dots \rangle$
- S reads X , sends data to R, who writes
- deletion errors: reception not guaranteed
- required: protocol that satisfies
 - **safety**: for some Y, we have $X = T; Y$
 - **liveness**: every x_i of X appears eventually in Y

specification

- $i := 0;$
- while true do
 - begin read(x_i)
 - send(x_i) until $K K x_i$;
 - $i := i + 1$
- end
- when $K x_0$ set $i := 0$
- while true do
 - begin write (x_i)
 - send($K x_i$) until $K(\)$
 - $i := i + 1$
- end

not correct

- $X = \langle a, a, a, c, a, b, \dots \rangle$



specification

```

i := 0;
while true do
begin read(xi)
  send(xi) until KK xi;
  send(KK xi) until KKKK xi
  i := i + 1
end
  
```

- when x_0 set $i := 0$
- while true do
- begin write (xi)
 - send(Kxi) until K
 - send(KKK xi) until
 - i := i+1
- end

specification

```

i := 0;
while true do
begin read(xi)
  send(xi) until KK xi;
  send(KK xi) until KKKK xi
  i := i + 1
end
  
```

- when x_0 set $i := 0$
- while true do
- begin write (xi)
 - send(Kxi) until KK
 - send(KKK xi) until
 - i := i+1
- end

specification

```

i := 0;
while true do
begin read(xi)
  send(xi) until a1 recvd;
  send(a2) until a3 recvd;
  i := i + 1
end
  
```

- when x_0 recvd s
- while true do
- begin write (xi)
 - send(a₁) until a₂
 - send(a₃) until xi
 - i := i+1
- end

Alternating Bit Protocol

$clr(m,i) = m_0$ if i is even, m_1 else

```

i := 0;
while true do
begin read(xi)
  send clr(xi,i) until
  clr(ack,i) recvd;
  i := i + 1
end
  
```

- when x_0 recvd s
- while true do
- begin write (xi)
 - send clr(ack,i) until
 - i := i+1

Alternating bit protocol

- knowledge of depth 4 is essential
- provable:
 - S sends $x_{i+1} \rightarrow$
 - $K_S \square (R \text{ receives } x_{i+1} \rightarrow K_R K_S K_R(x_i))$


Card Games

- there are three cards: r, w and b
- three players: 1, 2 and 3
- every player sees its own card
- use names for worlds:
 - rwb for 1 has red, 2 white, 3 black, etc.
- use colors for accessibilities:


Card Games (ctd)

- draw the appropriate $S5_{(3)}$ Kripke model
- show that in rbw it holds that:
 - $K_1 r_1$
 - $K_1(K_2 \neg r_2) \wedge K_1(\neg K_2 r_1 \wedge \neg K_2 r_3)$


Card Games: HEXA




Card Games: HEXA



Card Games: HEXA




Properties of HEXA




- $M, rbw \models K_1 r_1$
 - $M, rbw \models r_1$
 - $M, rbw \models r_1$

Properties of HEXA



- $K_1(K_2 \neg r_2) \wedge K_1(\neg K_2 r_1)$
- $M, rbw \models K_1 K_2 \neg r_2$, since
 - $M, rbw \models K_2 \neg r_2$, since
 - $M, rbw \models \neg r_2$ and
 - $M, bwr \models \neg r_2$
 - $M, rbw \models \neg K_2 r_1$, since
 - $M, rbw \models \neg r_1$ and
 - $M, bwr \models \neg r_1$

Properties of HEXA




- $K_1(K_2\neg r_2) \wedge K_1(\neg K_2r_1 \wedge \neg$
- $M, rwb \models K_1(\neg K_2r_1 \wedge \neg K$
- since
 - $M, rwb \models \neg K_2r_1 \wedge \neg K_2r_3$
 - $M, wbr \models \neg r_1$ and
 - $M, rwb \models \neg r_3$
 - $M, rwb \models \neg K_2r_1 \wedge \neg K_2r_3$
 - $M, wbr \models \neg r_1$ and
 - $M, rwb \models \neg r_3$

Exercise 3

- Ann and Bob each have a number on their head: Ann can only see Bob's who can only see Ann's. However, it is known by everybody that the numbers are successors of each other, i.e. n and $n + 1$ for some n .
- Draw the appropriate model.


Exercise 3



Exercise 4

- Ann and Bob are in a bar, in front of them is an envelope for Ann, with an invitation to go out in Amsterdam (p) or one to give a lecture ($\neg p$)
- Draw the corresponding Kripke model where nobody has looked in the envelope yet
- Suppose A reads the letter in the envelope

Exercise 4



Exercise 5

- let a_n be: "Ann has number n ", similarly for b_n "Bob has number n "
- 5a Show: $M, (3,4) \models \neg K_B b_4 \wedge K_A \neg K_B b_4$
- let $K_A a$ denote: A knows what her number is, similarly for $K_B b$
- 5b Show: $M, (1,2) \models M_B K_A a$, or equivalently: $M, (3,4) \models \neg K_B \neg K_A a$
- 5c Show: $M, (3,4) \models M_B M_A M_B K_A a$, or equivalently: $M, (3,4) \models \neg K_B$
-

Exercise 6

Let \mathcal{I}_n be: "An has number n ", similarly for b_n "Bob has number n ". Suppose the real world is $(3,4)$. Call the model M (see below).

ia. Show $M, (3,4) \models \neg M_B M_A K_B b \wedge M_B M_A M_B K_A a$

ib. Suppose Ann says: I don't know my number
Draw the new model M_1 . Show $M_1, (3,4) \models \neg M_B K_A a \wedge M_B M_A K_B b$

ic. Suppose now Bob says: I don't know my number
Draw the new model M_2 . Show $M_2, (3,4) \models \neg K_B b \wedge M_B K_A a$

id. Suppose now Ann says: I don't know my number
Draw the new model M_3 . Show $M_3, (3,4) \models K_B b$!!

Exercise 6

Let \mathcal{I}_n be: "An has number n ", similarly for b_n "Bob has number n ". Suppose the real world is $(3,4)$. Call the model M (see below).

ia. Show $M, (3,4) \models \neg M_B M_A K_B b \wedge M_B M_A M_B K_A a$

Moreover, $K_A a$ is true only in $(1,0)$. From $(3,4)$ there is a B-A-B path to more precisely:

- $\mathcal{I}, (1,0) \models K_A a$
- $\mathcal{I}, (1,2) \models M_B K_A a$
- $\mathcal{I}, (3,2) \models M_A M_B K_A a$
- $\mathcal{I}, (3,4) \models M_B M_A M_B K_A a$

Exercise 6

Let \mathcal{I}_n be: "An has number n ", similarly for b_n "Bob has number n ". Suppose the real world is $(3,4)$. Call the model M (see below).

ib. Suppose Ann says: I don't know my number
Draw the new model M_1 . Show $M_1, (3,4) \models \neg M_B K_A a \wedge M_B M_A K_B b$

There is no point at which $K_A a$ holds, so $M_1, (3,4) \models \neg M_B K_A a$

$K_B b$ is true at $(1,2)$, and there is a B-A path to $(1,2)$, hence
 $\mathcal{I}_1, (3,4) \models M_B M_A K_B b$

$\mathcal{I}_1, (1,2) \models K_B b$, thus $M_1, (3,2) \models M_A K_B b$ thus $M_1, (3,4) \models M_B M_A K_B b$

Exercise 6

Let \mathcal{I}_n be: "An has number n ", similarly for b_n "Bob has number n ". Suppose the real world is $(3,4)$. Call the model M (see below).

ia. Show $M, (3,4) \models \neg M_B M_A K_B b \wedge M_B M_A M_B K_A a$

First of all, note that $K_B b$ is true nowhere: Bob is uncertain everywhere
This explains $M, (3,4) \models \neg M_B M_A K_B b$ (in fact $M, x \models \neg M_B M_A K_B b$ for all

Moreover, $K_A a$ is true only in $(1,0)$. From $(3,4)$ there is a B-A-B path to

Exercise 6

Let \mathcal{I}_n be: "An has number n ", similarly for b_n "Bob has number n ". Suppose the real world is $(3,4)$. Call the model M (see below).

ia. Show $M, (3,4) \models \neg M_B M_A K_B b \wedge M_B M_A M_B K_A a$

First of all, note that $K_B b$ is true nowhere: Bob is uncertain everywhere
This explains $M, (3,4) \models \neg M_B M_A K_B b$ (in fact $M, x \models \neg M_B M_A K_B b$ for all

Moreover, $K_A a$ is true only in $(1,0)$. From $(3,4)$ there is a B-A-B path to
so, $M, (3,4) \models M_B M_A M_B K_A a$

Exercise 6

Let \mathcal{I}_n be: "An has number n ", similarly for b_n "Bob has number n ". Suppose the real world is $(3,4)$. Call the model M_2 (see below).

ic. Suppose now Bob says: I don't know my number
Draw the new model M_2 . Show $M_2, (3,4) \models \neg K_B b \wedge M_B K_A a$

There is no point where $K_B b$ is true, hence $(3,4) \models \neg K_B b$

$K_A a$ is true at $(3,2)$, hence $(3,4) \models M_B K_A a$

Exercise 6

Let a_n be: "Ann has number n ", similarly for b_n "Bob has number n ". Suppose the real world is $(3,4)$. Call the model M_3 (see below).

id. Suppose now Ann says: I don't know my number. Draw the new model M_3 . Show $M_3, (3,4) \models K_B b$!!

This is clear: in $(3,4)$, Bob has no doubt!


Exercise 7



For any item, start from M again.


- Suppose Ann reads the letter aloud: it says p ! Draw the model M_1
- Bob holds it for possible that A read the letter. Draw M_2
- An outsider tells A and B that one of them has read the letter. Draw
- An outsider tells A and B that one of them may have read the letter

Exercise 7




- Suppose Ann reads the letter aloud: it says p ! Draw the model M_1


Exercise 7




- Suppose Ann reads the letter aloud: it says p ! Draw the model M_1




Exercise 7



- Bob holds it for possible that A read the letter. Draw M_2



Exercise 7




- An outsider tells A and B that one of them has read the letter. Draw




Exercise 7

1. An outsider tells A and B that one of them may have read the letter




Exercise 7

2. An outsider tells A and B that some (0, 1 or 2) of them may have re



Exercise 7


3. An outsider tells A and B that some (0, 1 or 2) of them may have re



Suppose only B read the
 $K_B p \wedge M_B K_A p \wedge M_B \neg K_A p$

Exercise 7


3. An outsider tells A and B that some (0, 1 or 2) of them may have re



Suppose A and B read th
 $K_B p \wedge K_A p \wedge M_B \neg K_A p \wedge M_B$

Exercise 7

3. An outsider tells A and B that some (0, 1 or 2) of them may have re



Suppose nobody read the
 $\neg K_B p \wedge \neg K_A p \wedge M_B K_A p \wedge$

Different Modal Systems

- Propositional Tautologies A1
- $K_i(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (K_i\phi \rightarrow K_i\psi)$ A2
- $K_i\phi \rightarrow \phi$ A3
- $K_i\phi \rightarrow K_iK\phi$ A4
- $\neg K\phi \rightarrow K\neg K\phi$ A5
- $\vdash \phi \Rightarrow \vdash K_i\phi$ Nec

Different Modal Systems

- $K_i(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (K_i\phi \rightarrow K_i\psi)$ A2
- $K_i\phi \rightarrow \phi$ A3
- $K_i\phi \rightarrow K_iK_i\phi$ A4
- $\neg K_i\phi \rightarrow K_i\neg K_i\phi$ A5

Different Modal Systems

- Propositional tautologies, Nec
 - $K_i(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (K_i\phi \rightarrow K_i\psi)$
 - $K_i\phi \rightarrow \phi$
 - $K_i\phi \rightarrow K_iK_i\phi$
 - $\neg K_i\phi \rightarrow K_i\neg K_i\phi$
- $\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{■ Propositional tautologies, Nec} \\ \text{■ } K_i(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (K_i\phi \rightarrow K_i\psi) \end{array} \right\} \mathbf{K}_{(m)}$
 $\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{■ } K_i\phi \rightarrow \phi \\ \text{■ } K_i\phi \rightarrow K_iK_i\phi \\ \text{■ } \neg K_i\phi \rightarrow K_i\neg K_i\phi \end{array} \right\} \mathbf{T}_{(m)}$
 $\left. \begin{array}{l} \mathbf{K}_{(m)} \\ \mathbf{T}_{(m)} \end{array} \right\} \mathbf{S}$

Different Modal Systems

- Propositional tautologies, Nec
 - $K_i(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (K_i\phi \rightarrow K_i\psi)$
 - $\neg K_i\perp$
 - $K_i\phi \rightarrow K_iK_i\phi$
 - $\neg K_i\phi \rightarrow K_i\neg K_i\phi$
- $\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{■ Propositional tautologies, Nec} \\ \text{■ } K_i(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (K_i\phi \rightarrow K_i\psi) \end{array} \right\} \mathbf{K}_{(m)}$
 $\left. \begin{array}{l} \mathbf{K}_{(m)} \\ \text{■ } \neg K_i\perp \end{array} \right\} \mathbf{KD}_{(m)}$
 $\left. \begin{array}{l} \mathbf{KD}_{(m)} \\ \text{■ } K_i\phi \rightarrow K_iK_i\phi \\ \text{■ } \neg K_i\phi \rightarrow K_i\neg K_i\phi \end{array} \right\} \mathbf{KD4}_i$

Different Semantic System

- Kripke Models
 - Accessibility Relations R_i
 - R_i is reflexive
 - R_i is transitive
 - R_i is Euclidean
- $\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{■ Kripke Models} \\ \text{■ Accessibility Relations } R_i \end{array} \right\} \mathcal{K}_{(m)}$
 $\left. \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{K}_{(m)} \\ \text{■ } R_i \text{ is reflexive} \\ \text{■ } R_i \text{ is transitive} \\ \text{■ } R_i \text{ is Euclidean} \end{array} \right\} \mathcal{T}_{(m)}$
 $\left. \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{K}_{(m)} \\ \mathcal{T}_{(m)} \end{array} \right\} S4$

Different Semantic System

- Kripke Models
 - Accessibility Relations R_i
 - R_i is serial
 - R_i is transitive
 - R_i is Euclidean
- $\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{■ Kripke Models} \\ \text{■ Accessibility Relations } R_i \end{array} \right\} \mathcal{K}_{(m)}$
 $\left. \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{K}_{(m)} \\ \text{■ } R_i \text{ is serial} \\ \text{■ } R_i \text{ is transitive} \\ \text{■ } R_i \text{ is Euclidean} \end{array} \right\} \mathcal{KD}_{(m)}$
 $\left. \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{KD}_{(m)} \end{array} \right\} \mathcal{KD4}_{(m)}$

Relating the Systems

$$\begin{array}{ccccccc}
 \models \varphi & \Rightarrow & \mathcal{KD}_{(m)} \models \varphi & \Rightarrow & \mathcal{T}_{(m)} \models \varphi & \Rightarrow & S4_{(m)} \models \varphi & \Rightarrow \\
 \Downarrow & & \Downarrow & & \Downarrow & & \Downarrow & \\
 \vdash \varphi & \Rightarrow & \mathbf{KD}_{(m)} \vdash \varphi & \Rightarrow & \mathbf{T}_{(m)} \vdash \varphi & \Rightarrow & \mathbf{S4}_{(m)} \vdash \varphi & =
 \end{array}$$

Example Derivation


$$S5_{(m)} \vdash \neg K_i \phi \leftrightarrow K_i \neg K_i \phi$$

- $\neg K_i \phi \rightarrow K_i \neg K_i \phi$
- $K_i \neg K_i \phi \rightarrow \neg K_i \phi$
- $\neg K_i \phi \leftrightarrow K_i \neg K_i \phi$

Counterexamples

$$S4_{(m)} \vdash \neg K_i \phi \leftrightarrow K_i \neg K_i \phi \quad ?$$

Answer is **NO!** Because $S4_{(m)} \not\models \neg K_i \phi \leftrightarrow K_i \neg K_i \phi$




$M \not\models \neg K_i \phi \leftrightarrow K_i \neg K_i \phi$
 Because
 $M, w \models \neg K_i p$
 Because $M, v \models$

Counterexamples

$$S4_{(m)} \vdash \neg K_i \phi \leftrightarrow K_i \neg K_i \phi \quad ?$$

Answer is **NO!** Because $S4_{(m)} \not\models \neg K_i \phi \leftrightarrow K_i \neg K_i \phi$




$M \not\models \neg K_i \phi \leftrightarrow K_i \neg K_i \phi$
 Because
 $M, w \models \neg K_i p$, and
 $M, w \models \neg K_i \neg K_i p$

Counterexamples

$$S4_{(m)} \vdash \neg K_i \phi \leftrightarrow K_i \neg K_i \phi \quad ?$$

Answer is **NO!** Because $S4_{(m)} \not\models \neg K_i \phi \leftrightarrow K_i \neg K_i \phi$




$M \not\models \neg K_i \phi \leftrightarrow K_i \neg K_i \phi$
 Because
 $M, w \models \neg K_i p$, and
 $M, w \models \neg K_i \neg K_i p$

Counterexamples

$$S4_{(m)} \vdash \neg K_i \phi \leftrightarrow K_i \neg K_i \phi \quad ?$$

Answer is **NO!** Because $S4_{(m)} \not\models \neg K_i \phi \leftrightarrow K_i \neg K_i \phi$



$M \not\models \neg K_i \phi \leftrightarrow K_i \neg K_i \phi$
 and
 $M \in S4_{(m)}$

Validities

We already derived: $S5_{(m)} \vdash \neg K_i \phi \leftrightarrow K_i \neg K_i \phi$

We could also have proved: $S5_{(m)} \vdash \neg K_i \phi \leftrightarrow K_i \neg K_i \phi$

It of all, $\neg K_i \phi \leftrightarrow K_i \neg K_i \phi$
 equivalent to $\neg \neg K_i \phi \leftrightarrow \neg K_i \neg K_i \phi$
 equivalent to $K_i \phi \leftrightarrow \neg K_i \neg K_i \phi$
 equivalent to $K_i \phi \leftrightarrow M_i K_i \phi$

Validities

We already derived: $S5_{(m)} \vdash \neg K_i \phi \leftrightarrow K_i \neg K_i \phi$

We could also have proved: $S5_{(m)} \models \neg K_i \phi \leftrightarrow K_i \neg K_i \phi$

First of all, $\neg K_i \phi \leftrightarrow K_i \neg K_i \phi$ is equivalent to $K_i \phi \leftrightarrow M_i \neg \phi$

Let $M \in S5_{(m)}$ and w a world in M . To prove: $M, w \models K_i \phi$

Suppose $M, w \models K_i \phi$

Since R_i is reflexive, we have $R_i w w$ and hence $M, w \models M_i K_i \phi$

This proves $M, w \models K_i \phi \rightarrow M_i K_i \phi$

Validities

We already derived: $S5_{(m)} \vdash \neg K_i \phi \leftrightarrow K_i \neg K_i \phi$

We could also have proved: $S5_{(m)} \models \neg K_i \phi \leftrightarrow K_i \neg K_i \phi$

First of all, $\neg K_i \phi \leftrightarrow K_i \neg K_i \phi$ is equivalent to $K_i \phi \leftrightarrow M_i \neg \phi$


Let $M \in S5_{(m)}$ and w a world in M . To prove: $M, w \models K_i \phi$

suppose $M, w \models M_i K_i \phi$

here is u , $R_i w u$ and $M, u \models K_i \phi$

take v , $R_i w v$. To prove: $M, v \models \phi$

since R_i is Euclidean, we have $R_i u v$. So $M, v \models \phi$



Tactics

Let $X_{(m)}$ be any logic, for which $X_{(m)} \vdash \varphi \leftrightarrow X_{(m)} \models \varphi$

To prove $X_{(m)} \vdash \psi$

either use the axioms and rules of $X_{(m)}$
or use completeness and show $X_{(m)} \models \psi$

To prove $X_{(m)} \not\vdash \psi$

show that there is a model $M \in X_{(m)}$ such that $M, w \not\models \psi$

Tactics

Let $X_{(m)}$ be any logic, for which $X_{(m)} \vdash \varphi \leftrightarrow X_{(m)} \models \varphi$

A formula ψ is $X_{(m)}$ -satisfiable if there is a $M \in X_{(m)}$
so that $M, w \models \psi$

A formula ψ is $X_{(m)}$ -consistent if

$X_{(m)} \not\vdash \neg \psi$ if
 $X_{(m)} \not\models \neg \psi$ if

Tactics

Let $X_{(m)}$ be any logic, for which $X_{(m)} \vdash \varphi \leftrightarrow X_{(m)} \models \varphi$

A formula ψ is $X_{(m)}$ -valid if
for all $M \in X_{(m)}$: $M, w \models \psi$

A formula ψ is $X_{(m)}$ -derivable if
 $X_{(m)} \vdash \psi$ if

Exercise 8

Are the following formulas valid with respect to $K_{(m)}$? $T_{(m)}$? $S4_{(m)}$? $S5_{(m)}$?

- (a) $\phi \rightarrow K_i \phi$
- (b) $\phi \rightarrow K_i \neg K_i \neg \phi$
- (c) $K_i \phi \rightarrow \neg K_i \neg \phi$
- (d) $\neg K_i \phi \rightarrow K_i \neg \phi$

Group Notions

W. van der Hoek

epistemic logic

- $K(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (K\phi \rightarrow K\psi)$
 - agents reason rationally
- $K\phi \rightarrow \phi$
 - veridicality
- $K\phi \rightarrow KK\phi$
 - positive introspection
- $\neg K\phi \rightarrow K\neg K\phi$
 - negative introspection
- $\vdash \phi \Rightarrow \vdash K\phi$
 - agents know tautologies

Everybody knows

- $E\phi$: Everybody knows ϕ
- definition: $E\phi \equiv K_1\phi \wedge K_2\phi \wedge \dots \wedge K_n\phi$
- veridical? introspective?

Distributed knowledge

- $D\phi$: it is distributed knowledge that ϕ
- idea: $(K_1\phi \wedge K_2(\phi \rightarrow \psi)) \rightarrow D\psi$
- veridical? introspective?
- 'wise man' to whom everybody tells
- also called "implicit knowledge" ($I\phi$)

Group notions

- | | |
|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ $E\phi \equiv K_1\phi \wedge K_2\phi \wedge \dots \wedge K_n\phi$ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ everybody knows ϕ ■ $K_i\phi \rightarrow D\phi$ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ if one knows it, it is distributed ■ $D(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (D\phi \rightarrow D\psi)$ ■ $D\phi \rightarrow \phi$ ■ $D\phi \rightarrow DD\phi$ ■ $\neg D\phi \rightarrow D\neg D\phi$ | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ $K_i(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (K_i\phi \rightarrow K_i\psi)$ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ agents reason rationally ■ $K_i\phi \rightarrow \phi$ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ veridicality ■ $K_i\phi \rightarrow K_iK_i\phi$ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ positive introspection ■ $\neg K_i\phi \rightarrow K_i\neg K_i\phi$ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ negative introspection ■ $\vdash \phi \Rightarrow \vdash K_i\phi$ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ agents know tautologies |
|---|--|

Distributed knowledge

- Consider the following derivation rule:

$$D \frac{(\phi_1 \wedge \phi_2 \wedge \dots \wedge \phi_n) \rightarrow \psi}{(K_1\phi_1 \wedge K_2\phi_2 \wedge \dots \wedge K_n\phi_n) \rightarrow D\psi}$$

Adding PD as a rule or $K_i\phi \rightarrow D\phi$ as an axiom is equivalent

Group notions: semantics

- $E\phi \equiv K_1\phi \wedge K_2\phi \wedge \dots K_n\phi$
 - everybody knows ϕ
- $R_E = R_1 \cup R_2 \cup \dots$
 - taking the union
- $K_i\phi \rightarrow D\phi$
 - if one knows it, it is distributed
- $R_D \subseteq R_1 \cap R_2 \cap \dots$
 - not an equivalence

Group notions: semantics


R_1, R_2, R_D

$V(t) = V'(t) = V'(t1) = V'(t2)$

$M, s \models \phi \Leftrightarrow M', s' \models \phi$



- $R_D \subseteq R_1 \cap R_2 \cap \dots$
 - not an equivalence



Multi-agent knowledge


$K_A a$: A knows a

B sends m to A

$K_B m$?


$K_A K_B m$?

$K_{..} K_{..} m$?



Bizantyne Generals

A



$K.m$

Common Knowledge

$C(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (C\phi \rightarrow C\psi)$

- agents reason rationally

$C\phi \rightarrow \phi$

- veridicality

$C\phi \rightarrow EC\phi$

- and vice versa

■ $K_i(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (K_i\phi$

- agents reason rati

■ $K_i\phi \rightarrow \phi$

- veridicality

■ $K_i\phi \rightarrow K_i K_i\phi$

- positive introspec

■ $\neg K_i\phi \rightarrow K_i \neg K_i\phi$

- negative introspec

■ $\vdash \phi \Rightarrow \vdash K_i\phi$

- agents know tautc

Common Knowledge

$C(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (C\phi \rightarrow C\psi)$

- agents reason rationally

$C\phi \rightarrow \phi$

- veridicality

$C\phi \rightarrow EC\phi$

- and vice versa

$C(\phi \rightarrow E\psi) \rightarrow (\phi \rightarrow C\psi)$

- "induction"

$\vdash \phi \Rightarrow \vdash C\phi$

■ $K_i(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (K_i\phi$

- agents reason rat.

■ $K_i\phi \rightarrow \phi$

- veridicality

■ $K_i\phi \rightarrow K_i K_i\phi$

- positive introspec

■ $\neg K_i\phi \rightarrow K_i \neg K_i\phi$

- negative introspec

■ $\vdash \phi \Rightarrow \vdash K_i\phi$

- agents know tautc

Common Knowledge

- $C(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (C\phi \rightarrow C\psi)$
 - *agents reason rationally*
 - $C\phi \rightarrow \phi$
 - *veridicality*
 - $C\phi \rightarrow EC\phi$
 - *and vice versa*
 - $C(\phi \rightarrow E\psi) \rightarrow (\phi \rightarrow C\psi)$
 - *"induction"*
 - $\vdash \phi \Rightarrow \vdash C\phi$
- Semantically, it boils down to
 - $R_C = R_E^*$
 - that is, the reflexive transitive closure


Common Knowledge

- $E\phi$: Everybody knows ϕ
- $E\phi \not\rightarrow EE\phi$
- $C\phi$: it is Common Knowledge that ϕ
- idea: $C\phi = E\phi \ \& \ EE\phi \ \& \ EEE\phi \ \& \ EEE\phi \ \& \ \dots$
- so: $\neg C\phi$ if somebody
 - considers it possible that
 - somebody considers it possible that


Alco at a conference

- A is at a conference. He decides to leave the room and have a drink at the bar.
 - There is an announcement ϕ : no talks tomorrow morning
 - $E\phi? C\phi?$
 - Then, A leaves the bar for a walk outside.
 - B says: "A is not here!" President: "intercom in bar!"
 - $E\phi? EE\phi? C\phi?$
 - A is told all the above
 - $E\phi? EE\phi? EEE\phi? C\phi?$

c children, m are muddy




$c = 8, m = 3$




At least one of you is muddy.
If you know that you are, step forward


c = 4, m = 3 (Kripke mod




c = 4, m = 3 (Kripke mod



c = 4, m = 3 (Kripke mod



c = 4, m = 3 (Kripke mod



Group Knowledge

$$K_1\varphi \wedge K_2(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow D\varphi$$

$$C\varphi \Rightarrow E\varphi \Rightarrow K_i\varphi \Rightarrow D\varphi \Rightarrow \varphi$$



"any fool knows"






"a wise man knows"

Common Knowledge cannot be obtained through communication
 $C\varphi \leftrightarrow EC\varphi$

Ignorance

- P and S are in a room, $l \times b$
- $2 \leq b \leq l \leq 99$
- P knows $l \times b$
- S knows $l + b$





Advanced Byzantine Gene

- S and R are involved in a protocol
- It is common knowledge that:
 - messages derive either immediately or with ε time delay


Advanced Byzantine Gene

- S and R are involved in a protocol
- It is common knowledge that:
 - messages derive either immediately or with ε time delay
- S sends m at t_0 .
- When do we have C_m ????????


Advanced Byzantine Gene

- let s : "sent", d : "delivered" e : "delay"
- suppose there is no delay
- time: $t_0, t_1 = t_0 + \varepsilon, \dots, t_n = t_0 + n\varepsilon$
- Sender is **red**, Receiver is **green**
- reflexive arrows are implicit
- \bullet means delay, \circ means no delay
- m means: message has arrived


Advanced Byzantine Gene



Advanced Byzantine Gene



Advanced Byzantine Gene




Advance Byzantine Genera

- S and R are involved in a protocol
- It is common knowledge that:
 - messages derive either immediately or via time delay
- S sends m at t_0 .
- When do we have C_m ????????


WTF!!!

Backward Induction




Centipede

- 1 and 2 divide n marbles; they choose turn, if somebody picks two, the game over



Centipede

- Intuitively correct?



Gossiping

- six friends each have a gossip. They call each other
- at each call, they share their information
- at least how many calls are needed to bring all of to date with respect to all the gossips?

7?

8?

9?

Common Knowledge

- $\lambda 7$ $C\phi \rightarrow \phi$
 - veridicality
 - $\lambda 8$ $C\phi \rightarrow EC\phi$
 - building iterations
 - $\lambda 9$ $C(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (C\phi \rightarrow C\psi)$
 - agents reason rationally
 - $\lambda 10$ $C(\phi \rightarrow E\psi) \rightarrow (\phi \rightarrow C\psi)$
 - "induction"
 - $\lambda 3$ $\vdash \phi \Rightarrow \vdash C\phi$
- $K_i(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (K_i\phi \rightarrow K_i\psi)$
 - agents reason rationally
 - $K_i\phi \rightarrow \phi$
 - veridicality
 - $K_i\phi \rightarrow K_iK_i\phi$
 - positive introspection
 - $\neg K_i\phi \rightarrow K_i\neg K_i\phi$
 - negative introspection
 - $\vdash \phi \Rightarrow \vdash K_i\phi$
 - agents know tautolog

Different Modal Systems

- 1 Propositional tautologies, Nec
 - 7 $C\phi \rightarrow \phi$
 - 3 $C\phi \rightarrow EC\phi$
 - 9 $C(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (C\phi \rightarrow C\psi)$
 - 10 $C(\phi \rightarrow E\psi) \rightarrow (\phi \rightarrow C\psi)$
 - 5 $\vdash \phi \Rightarrow \vdash C\phi$
 - $K_i\phi \rightarrow \phi$
 - $K_i\phi \rightarrow K_iK_i\phi$
- Groupings: $\{1, 7, 3, 9, 10, 5\}$ is $KEC_{(m)}$; $\{1, 7, 3, 9, 10, 5, K_i\phi \rightarrow \phi, K_i\phi \rightarrow K_iK_i\phi\}$ is $TEC_{(m)}$; $\{1, 7, 3, 9, 10, 5, K_i\phi \rightarrow \phi, K_i\phi \rightarrow K_iK_i\phi, C\phi \rightarrow \phi\}$ is $S4EC_{(m)}$.

Lemma (X-distribution)

Let X be a necessity operator. Then:

$$\mathbf{K}_{(m)} \vdash \phi \rightarrow \psi \Rightarrow \mathbf{K}_{(m)} \vdash X\phi \rightarrow X\psi$$

Proof. Let X be a necessity operator.

suppose $\mathbf{K}_{(m)} \vdash \phi \rightarrow \psi$

then, by necessitation, $\mathbf{K}_{(m)} \vdash X(\phi \rightarrow \psi)$

we also have $\mathbf{K}_{(m)} \vdash X(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow (X\phi \rightarrow X\psi)$

Iterations of Modal Opera

For any operator X, define $X^n\phi$ by induction on n:

$$X^0\phi = \phi$$

$$X^{n+1}\phi = XX^n\phi$$

Example:

$$K_2^3\phi = K_2K_2K_2\phi, E^5\phi = EEEEE\phi$$

$$\text{and even } (K_2E)^4\phi = K_2EK_2EK_2EK_2E\phi$$

First Property

Claim: for every n , $\mathbf{KEC}_{(m)} \vdash C\phi \rightarrow E^n\phi$

1 $C\phi \rightarrow \phi$ A7

hence,
 $C\phi \rightarrow E^0\phi$ since $E^0\phi = \phi$, by definition of E^0

First Property

Claim: for every n , $\mathbf{KEC}_{(m)} \vdash C\phi \rightarrow E^n\phi$
 suppose we already proven: $\mathbf{KEC}_{(m)} \vdash C\phi \rightarrow E^k\phi$

1 $C\phi \rightarrow E^k\phi$ ass
 2 $C\phi \rightarrow EC\phi$ A8
 3 $EC\phi \rightarrow EE^k\phi$ 2, E-distr.
 4 $C\phi \rightarrow EE^k\phi$ 2,3,A1

hence,
 $C\phi \rightarrow E^{(k+1)}\phi$ since $EE^k\phi = E^{(k+1)}\phi$ by definition of

First Property: winding up

$\mathbf{KEC}_{(m)} \vdash C\phi \rightarrow E^0\phi$

$\mathbf{KEC}_{(m)} \vdash C\phi \rightarrow E^1\phi$

if $\mathbf{KEC}_{(m)} \vdash C\phi \rightarrow E^k\phi$ then $\mathbf{KEC}_{(m)} \vdash C\phi \rightarrow E^{(k+1)}\phi$

$\mathbf{KEC}_{(m)} \vdash C\phi \rightarrow E^1\phi$ so $\mathbf{KEC}_{(m)} \vdash C\phi \rightarrow E^2\phi$

$\mathbf{KEC}_{(m)} \vdash C\phi \rightarrow E^2\phi$ so $\mathbf{KEC}_{(m)} \vdash C\phi \rightarrow E^3\phi$

$\mathbf{KEC}_{(m)} \vdash C\phi \rightarrow \dots$ so $\mathbf{KEC}_{(m)} \vdash C\phi \rightarrow \dots$

Common Knowledge

$M, w \models E\phi \Leftrightarrow$
 $\forall v (R_E wv \Rightarrow M, v \models \phi)$
 with $R_E = R_1 \cup R_2 \cup \dots$

Definition of closure:

- $\forall x R_E^* xx$
- $R_E xy \Rightarrow R_E^* xy$
- $R_E^* xy \ \& \ R_E yz \Rightarrow R_E^* xz$


$M, w \models C\phi \Leftrightarrow$
 $\forall v (R_E^* wv \Rightarrow M, v \models \phi)$
 with R_E^* is reflexive transitive closure of R_E

Common Knowledge

Definition of closure:

- $\forall x R_E^* xx$
- $R_E xy \Rightarrow R_E^* xy$
- $R_E^* xy \ \& \ R_E yz \Rightarrow R_E^* xz$

$M, w \models C\phi \Leftrightarrow$
 $M, w \models \phi \ \&$
 $\forall v (R_E wv \Rightarrow M, v \models \phi) \ \&$
 $\forall v \forall u (R_E wv \ \& \ R_E vu \Rightarrow M, u \models \phi)$
 $\forall v \forall u \forall t (R_E wv \ \& \ R_E vu \ \& \ R_E ut \Rightarrow M, t \models \phi)$




Common Knowledge

Definition of closure:

- $\forall x R_E^* xx$
- $R_E xy \Rightarrow R_E^* xy$
- $R_E^* xy \ \& \ R_E yz \Rightarrow R_E^* xz$

$M, w \models \neg C\phi \Leftrightarrow$
 $M, w \models \neg\phi$ or
 $\exists v (R_E wv \ \& \ M, v \models \neg\phi)$ or
 $\exists v \exists u (R_E wv \ \& \ R_E vu \ \& \ M, u \models \phi)$
 $\exists v \exists u \exists t (R_E wv \ \& \ R_E vu \ \& \ R_E ut \ \& \ M, t \models \phi)$



Soundness and Completeness

Given the truth definition $M, w \models C\phi \Leftrightarrow$

$$\forall v (R_E^* wv \Rightarrow M, v \models \phi)$$

$$\mathbf{KEC}_{(m)} \vdash \phi \Leftrightarrow \mathcal{K}_{(m)} \models \phi$$

$$\mathbf{TEC}_{(m)} \vdash \phi \Leftrightarrow \mathcal{T}_{(m)} \models \phi$$

$$\mathbf{S4EC}_{(m)} \vdash \phi \Leftrightarrow \mathcal{S4}_{(m)} \models \phi$$

$$\mathbf{S5EC}_{(m)} \vdash \phi \Leftrightarrow \mathcal{S5}_{(m)} \models \phi$$

Interpreted Systems

W. van der Hoek


Interpreted Systems

- We have m processors
- each i can be in a number of states $\in L_i$
- Now build $M = \langle S, \pi, R_1, R_2, \dots, R_m \rangle$
 - $S = L_1 \times L_2 \times \dots \times L_m$
 - $s = \langle s_1, s_2, \dots, s_m \rangle \mid s_i \in L_i$
 - $\pi: S \rightarrow P \rightarrow \{t, f\}$
 - $R = \{ (s, t) \mid s, t \in S \}$ **RELATION!!**


Interpreted Systems: Example

- Two processors: A and B
- $L_A = L_B = \{0, 1, 2\}$
- $S = L_A \times L_B = \{ (0,0), (0,1), (0,2), (1,0), (1,1), (1,2), (2,0), (2,1), (2,2) \}$
- $R_A s t \Leftrightarrow R_A (x_1, y_1) (x_2, y_2) \Leftrightarrow x_1 = x_2$


Interpreted Systems: Example




Interpreted Systems: Example




Interpreted Systems: Example 9




Interpreted Systems: Example 10




Interpreted Systems: Run



Distr. Systems: Exercise 9



Exercise 10




Intr. Systems: Example 2

- Three processors: A, F and T
- $L_A = \{n, s, b, l\}$, $L_F = \{0, 1\}$, $L_T = \{0, 1\}$
- use atoms $a=s$, $f=0$, $t=7$, etc, in $\langle f, a, t \rangle$
- Make a drawing of this system, and show that
- $M_1(1, n, 2) \models M_F K_T(t=0)$






IS: Example 2







fix $t = 0$

wich we draw as:





IS: Example 2






$R_F(1,n,2) (:$
 $M(1,0) I$



Exercise 12

12a. Give a ϕ for which $M_r(0,n,0) \models E\phi$


12b. show or disprove: $M_r(0,n,0) \models EE\phi \Leftrightarrow$



Exercise 12

12a. Give a ϕ for which $M_r(0,n,0) \models E\phi$


$M_r(0,n,0) \models E(f=0 \vee$



Exercise 12

12b. show or disprove: $M_r(0,n,0) \models EE\phi \Leftrightarrow$

\Leftarrow is obviously true




Exercise 12

12b. show or disprove: $M_r(0,n,0) \models EE\phi \Leftrightarrow$

$\Rightarrow: M_r(0,n,0) \models EE\phi$

$M_r(0,n,0) \models K_T E\phi =$



Exercise 12

12b. show or disprove: $M_r(0,n,0) \models EE\phi \Leftrightarrow$

$\Rightarrow: M_r(0,n,0) \models EE\phi$

$M_r(0,n,0) \models K_T E\phi =$

$M_r(x) \models E\phi$ for all x in

$M_r(0,n,0) \models E\phi$ and

$M_r(1,n,0) \models E\phi \Rightarrow$

$M_r(0,n,0) \models EE\phi$

Exercise 12

12b. show or disprove:
 $M, (0, n, 0) \models E\phi \Leftrightarrow$
 $\Rightarrow: M, (0, n, 0) \models E\phi$
 $M, (0, n, 0) \models K_T E\phi =$
 $M, x \models E\phi$ for all x in
 $M, (0, n, 0) \models E\phi$ and
 $M, (1, n, 0) \models E\phi \Rightarrow$
 $M, (0, n, 0) \models K_T \phi$

Exercise 13

Atoms:
 $x=0; x=1; x=2$ and
 $y=0; y=1; y=2$
 R_A and R_B are reflex
and transitive

13a. show:
 $M, (0, 0) \models E(x=0 \vee$

13b. show:
 $M, (0, 0) \models I(x=0 \wedge$

Exercise 13: Solution

13b. show:
 $M, (0, 0) \models I(x=0 \wedge y=0)$

$M, (0, 0) \models I\phi \Leftrightarrow$
 $\forall(x, y) (R_1(0, 0)(x, y) \Rightarrow M, (x, y) \models \phi \Leftrightarrow$
 $\forall(x, y) (R_A(0, 0)(x, y) \text{ and } R_B(0, 0)(x, y) =$
 $M, (x, y) \models \phi \Leftrightarrow$
 $\forall(x, y) (x=0 \text{ and } y=0 \Rightarrow M, (x, y) \models \phi)$

Exercise 13: solution

3c. show in interpreted systems: $M, w \models D\phi \Leftrightarrow \phi$

First of all: the \rightarrow direction is easy:
if $M, w \models D\phi$ then
 $\forall v \models \phi$ for all v such that $(R_1 \cap R_2 \dots \cap \dots R_n)wv$
in interpreted systems, $R_1 w w$, so $(R_1 \cap R_2 \dots \cap \dots R_n)wv$
so $M, w \models \phi$

Exercise 13: solution

3c. show in interpreted systems: $M, w \models D\phi \Leftrightarrow \phi$

Now suppose: $M, w \models \phi$. To prove: $M, w \models D\phi$

Recall that $w = \langle w_1, w_2, \dots, w_n \rangle$

Take an arbitrary v for which $(R_1 \cap R_2 \dots \cap \dots R_n)wv$

$R_1 w v$, so $v_1 = w_1$ and $R_2 w v$, so $v_2 = w_2 \dots$ and $R_n w v$, so
hence $v = \langle v_1, v_2, \dots, v_n \rangle = \langle w_1, w_2, \dots, w_n \rangle = w$